- Receivables Podcast
- February 2, 2024
Receivables Roundtable Ep. 160 – John Tonetti: The Evolution of the CFPB from a Former Insider
Summary: The evolution of the CFPB is examined from a former insider's perspective as John Tonetti, retired Senior Policy Analyst with the Bureau, joins Adam Parks on Receivables Roundtable. Tonetti recounts his career at American Express, Household and JPMorgan Chase, explains why a sole director produced sharp shifts across administrations, and critiques Bureau positions on medical debt credit reporting, overdraft fees and FDCPA interpretation.
Key Takeaways
- Tonetti joined the CFPB after its 2010 founding because he believed regulations and examinations would make no sense unless someone there understood how the collections industry operated.
- He says a sole director with an unaccountable funding source produced quantum changes in how the Bureau operated with each president, defeating the goal of political independence.
- Tonetti argues the proposal to remove medical debt from credit reports ignored how providers get paid, citing a doctor suing the credit bureaus over removal of debts below $500.
- He criticizes a Bureau amicus brief that spent 31 pages arguing there is no scienter requirement in the FDCPA while ignoring the consumer's 30-day dispute obligation under section 1692G.
- Tonetti disputes labeling overdraft fees as junk fees, saying they are disclosed and opted into, and that the Bureau's 92-page report only found lower-income consumers use overdraft more often.
Tune in for this Special Episode as Receivables Roundtable Founder, Adam Parks talks with John Tonetti, retired Senior Policy Analyst with the #CFPB and semi-retired compliance and regulatory consultant. The two discuss the evolution of the Bureau, former and current leadership, the law and its interpretation, consumer banking, and more. *The opinions discussed in this episode are personal opinions and do not represent those of any organization, including Receivables Info.
Read Podcast Transcript
Hello there everybody, Adam Parks here with another episode of Receivables Roundtable. Today I’m here with my good friend, former colleague, former boss and just an all-around well-known guy around the industry, Mr. John Tenetti. How you doing today, John? Good morning, Adam. I’m doing fine for the most part, recovering from finally catching COVID after almost four years of avoiding it. I’m sorry to hear that. I’ve been fortunate that I’ve avoided it and that my particular case seems to be pretty mild. My wife is suffering a little bit more than I am, but yeah, we’re doing all right. Well, I appreciate you jumping on and having this chat with me today. I know there’s just been so
much going on at the CFPB and I think you provide such an interesting perspective. But before we jump into this, I just want to make one thing clear that I’ve never really done on the podcast before and that’s to let everybody know that the opinions that we’re going to discuss today are my own personally and do not represent any associations or other organizations in which I am affiliated. But I think it’s important as we talk about the government, we start to provide honest feedback as to kind of what’s going on around our economy and around our country. I just thought it was important to make that quick little statement. But back to John Tenetti. John and I had the
opportunity to work together many, many years ago and I learned just an incredible amount from him during that time. John, for anybody who hasn’t been as lucky as me, could you tell everyone a little bit about yourself and how you got to the future and today? Yeah. Well, basically right now I’m pretty much retired. I’m doing some consulting and a couple of other outside expert witness gigs and things of that sort. But yeah, I got into the receivables management business a long time ago when there were still collection folders and no systems were automated. There were no dialers. There it was the good old days of debt collections
with American Express in Toronto. And I didn’t intend to get into receivables management, but I had a mentor there who told me once that at least within American Express when the receivables are good, there is money for everything. When the receivables are bad, there is no money for anything except fixing the receivables. So if you wanted to be where the action was, you wanted to be in receivables management. And I had an economics background, so I was good with statistics and risk management. So I eventually kind of worked my way into risk operations and risk management and spent some time on two occasions at American Express sometime with City
in the late 90s. I was the head of risk operations and the head of the risk committee at household credit services, which was the arm of household international became HSBC credit card and then it became now it’s Capital One. But then I left the creditor side and co-founded a collection agency with a couple other people, ended up running that and doing all the sales and marketing and operations and stuff like that came back to, well, I guess that’s about the time that when I left there, I got into the debt purchasing arena. That’s where we met, spent some time doing that. When the CFPB was founded in 2010, I got, I would say, sort of recruited. I ended up,
I had a friend who worked for the Federal Reserve. He told me that the CFPB was looking for someone that knew something about the collections industry because the CFPB was very interested in it. To be honest with you, I wasn’t really interested in working for the federal government, but I figured if there was no one in the industry or no one with an industry background that worked for the CFPB, how were they ever going to write regulations and do examinations that made any sense because nobody would know exactly how the industry operated. I kind of think that’s where we’ve ended up inadvertently, but I did that for a few years. Went back into the banking business
at JPMorgan Chase, where I was responsible for the coordination of the risk management organization’s response to the OCC’s consent order in 2013 versus JPMC. I think it took us three years to kind of put that aside. I think our goal was to get it done in a year. Then I went back to the CFPB for a while. I worked in the, I was a senior policy analyst in the Office of Supervision Policy specializing mainly in debt collections issues and credit reporting issues. I retired in June for the most part and now I’m happily ensconced in Asheville, North Carolina. It sounds like you have had quite the career coming through the receivables
management space with a lot of different perspectives, including working for the creditors, working on the collection side, the debt buying side, and even on the government side. So many different perspectives. As you’ve had that opportunity to work for the government, that’s got to be a pretty thankless job, in my personal opinion, to be the guy at the CFPB who actually understands the debt collection industry. You have to feel pretty alone in an organization like that with that kind of expertise. I spent a lot of time banging my head against the wall. I have the bruises to show for it. Fair. It’s pretty interesting that in some ways I found, you kind of have to
remember when I started with the government, the agency had just started. There were a lot of people within the agency. I don’t think it’s any secret that were acolytes of Senator Warren. That seemed to be the predominant theory, which is basically that the financial services industry is almost inherently a risky poses risk of consumer harm. I worked for the CFPB through the Cordray administration, through the Mulvaney administration, through the Craninger administration, through the Ouija interim, and now through the Trope administration, and really witnessed what I feared at the beginning of the CFPB, which is that having a sole director and pretty much an unaccountable funding source, you would have quantum changes in the way the Bureau operated
and how it viewed the industry, depending upon who the president was. It was interesting to me because the original thrust of making the agency independent was that it wouldn’t be subject to the vagaries of political wins. I don’t think that that objective has been anywhere close to being achieved. What was amplified, the whole scenario, the whole situation was exceptionally amplified by putting one person in charge and having that person be appointed in a political fashion. Exactly. But I don’t think that’s going to change. You know, I don’t think so either. But one of the things I find distressing is that it’s sort of changed the Bureau from being an independent. And I’d like to think that in some perfect world
government agencies are supposed to balance the risk of the consumer harm against what is good for the economy. And I certainly in the most recent past feel that that has been that that’s been dispensed with. I mean, you see things like, for example, the proposal to to eliminate medical debt from credit reports. There’s been no discussion that I have seen by the Bureau of what the impact that’s going to be upon consumers other than those people that might have medical debt on their credit reports, such as how do doctors get paid? You know, the only avenue that is left, I remember a couple, I guess a couple months ago, Seth Frotman said,
well, they don’t need to use credit reporting to collect bills. There are other avenues. Well, you take away the impact of credit reporting. What’s the next lever? Interest rate. A lawsuit too. Like, you know, is that the objective the Bureau wants? There is a lawsuit, I think it’s in California, or a doctor is suing the credit bureaus for removing debts below $500 saying that most of his debts are below $500. He now lacks leverage. You know, there was no consideration of that. No, as far as I could see in anything that the Bureau has put out with regard to removing medical debt from credit reports. It goes,
you know, further than that, even there are other things that just like boggle my mind. So, it has been interesting to watch it from the outside, right? And so I started becoming active on the political front of the industry about the time that the CFPB was coming into play. So I had the opportunity to meet with Cordray to meet with Mulvaney before he was the director to meet with Cranager. And I don’t think anyone’s ever going to have an opportunity to meet with Chopra because I don’t think he has any objective in his mind about having a fair and balanced discussion or ultimately learning anything about how our economic system functions.
One of the things that you said early on was that the CFPB was full of, I’m going to use the word disciples of Elizabeth Warren. And now one of her newest disciples without other political aspirations, at least that are visible at this point, is ready to kind of jump in there, right? I think Mulvaney, I think Cordray kind of had those political aspirations on a grander scale to become governor, which thankfully failed. But at least I feel like that held him to some level of responsibility to the public people. But for someone like Chopra who has, he’s not currently foreshadowing that type of political career, I feel like he’s just there to do
the disciple work and to not listen or interact with anybody else. It feels like the bureau has pushed itself out on an island to live there. Does that make sense? Yeah, I felt like Rich was a little bit more balanced in terms of, yeah, he looked at the industry and he was famous for saying, let’s push the envelope. I find that with Chopra, it’s it’s become more like we’re going to do what we want to do. And if you don’t like it, then you can sue us. However, suing the government is a long drawn out process. I mean, it’s fairly evident Eric Helperin in announcing that the bureau was hiring 50% more enforcement attorneys,
specifically stated two things. One was they need more enforcement attorneys to pursue the priorities of the bureau. Now, think about that. The priority of the bureau is to regulate by enforcement. Is that what he was saying? And the second thing was to push back on the amount of litigation that the bureau was facing because of its pronouncements. Now, I think that that’s going to increase rather than the decrease because I think the industry for the first 10 years of the bureau was kind of like, okay, we can live with this. Okay, we can live with this. Okay, we can live with this. And it’s kind of like a death by a thousand cuts. And you we’ve now gotten to the point where the bureau is
basically saying you can’t report medical debt. You there amicus brief on keroschio versus CICA basically says collectors are responsible for any errors for that a creditor has made if they try and collect those. And it’s totally ignored the obligation of a consumer under 1692G to make a dispute, which and in 1692G it actually says, you know, the consumer has 30 days to dispute a debt or a part of a debt. And you know, it’s very broad. You can be for any reason whatsoever. Otherwise, the collector can consider the debt valid. Now, that doesn’t mean that they can’t dispute it after 30 days. But the collector has a right to consider the debt valid. The bureau
is saying, no, that’s not true. That if there’s a problem with the debt and the collector tries to collect it, that’s a violation of the FTCP which is I mean, the bureau spent 31 pages talking about the idea that there is no sine to requirement within the FTCP and totally ignored 1692G. It’s even though the district court in the case that they’re dealing with spent pages on 1692G. So they’re not even acting as an honest broker at all. No, but that has not been the intent since he took power. Yeah, I think you’re right. I think you’re right. That, you know, I think if they were trying to do those things, if somebody
walked into the bureau and said, here, we’re here to try and find that balance, right? And I think you’re 150% right about finding that balance between the creditors’ rights and the consumers’ rights. And I do think that there’s a balance there because when the creditors’ rights can’t be enforced, interest rates go up, right? And we’re already seeing that due to inflation. We’re really, you know, hoping that we don’t see hyperinflation in 2024 and 2025 with all of the economic conditions that are happening. It’s a highly likely thing. De-dollarization on a global scale. I mean, there’s some serious things that are happening from an economic front. And it feels like we are just so laser focused on
trying to reduce the quality of underwriting. And that’s all that we really do with these credit bureau changes. We’re reducing it by 500. We’re going to increase these credit scores. Well, all that means is that I have to change my underwriting bans appropriately to adjust exactly that change. Increasing the credit scores did not increase the credit worthiness of the individuals. It just decreases the predictability of the model. And, you know, I had to laugh when the CFPD put out a report saying, you know, X number of million of consumers are going to see their credit scores rise, and therefore their credit will improve. And I’m like,
wait a second, you’ve totally missed the purpose of the model. And, you know, but that seems to be what I mean, I am shagrind at how few people work at the bureau that actually have had experience working in the credit arena. So, like, there are a lot of lawyers, and most of them are very smart, most of them are very good, and most of them know how to use the law to achieve an objective. But, you know, as I used to say quite frequently, if you have to take three pages to explain why you think this is the law, it’s probably not quite right. So, John, I think that is the smartest thing I’ve heard all day long, honestly.
Yeah. Like, there is a lot of twisting to enable an interpretation. So, anyway, Well, I think it’s belaboring a point to try and, you know, you’ve already set your objective is that this is this is what’s going to happen, or this is what my expectation and you’ll, you’re going to use anything that you can to justify the angle that you’re trying to get to. Make it right. You know, and the ultimate outcome is probably not good for consumers. Agreed. That’s the point. I mean, let’s take a look at overdraft fees. Like, the director and the president have decided that overdraft fees are junk fees. That I don’t understand. They’re disclosed. They are opted into. They have
consumer benefit. They balance the model. Right. The Bureau put out a 92 page report that basically said at the end of the day, people that have less money use overdraft more frequently. Okay. Seems like a blinding glimpse of the audience to me. But they never just and, you know, the expectation is that that report is a precursor to the Bureau putting out some rules on when banks can charge overdraft fees, how much they can charge, which, you know, I don’t believe the Bureau should be in the pricing. John, let’s be honest. They’re going to continue to push it until they get what they really want,
postal banking. Because the postal office is so efficient. I mean, they’re really good at delivering the mail. I always make a joke. I always say if I, you know, if I need something to get there, I send it FedEx. If I want it to get there, I send it UPS. If I really don’t give a shit, I send it through the postal service. And I believe that there is certainly some desire to nationalize the banking system. But is that what’s going to be good for consumers? No, you know, I brought this up many years ago to, I believe it was cordray in a conversation that we
were having kind of like off the record. We were talking about, you know, protecting the consumers. And I said, you know, you do realize that the retirement accounts of most of these consumers that you’re trying to protect are tied up in some sort of bank banking stock. Great. I feel like people, you know, saving the $20 today in a headline is very important. But saving the consumer long term money in their retirement account for their personal well-being not really at the forefront of needs right now, because it doesn’t mean that we have a sexy headline. Right. And, you know, what makes for a sexy headline, and you see it all the time, is, you know,
the CFPB forces XYZ company to pay $10 million to consumers, or forces them to pay a penalty of $10 million, which goes into a fund at the CFPB that has a lot of money in it currently and doesn’t seem to be doing anything. Do anything. Yeah. I mean, because they’re building a war chest, they’re not using it for its intended purpose. I can’t say that I would disagree with that. Yeah. It just strikes me as very one-sided, not very consumer-friendly, and more political than it is practical. My gut tells me that something’s not right there. Yeah. It’s- Maybe a commission could figure out how to spend that money correctly.
Which is a shame, because, you know, one of the obvious questions is that, you know, if I feel this way about the bureau, why did I work there? And, you know, which is a really good question. And the reason I went to work for the bureau was twofold. The first is that I recognize that if you’re going to have someone, an entity, an agency that is in charge of the financial services industry, you really should have people working there that know something about financial services, industry, not just lawyers. Not to say that lawyers can’t learn something about financial services industry, but you can’t just have people that know the law and don’t know anything about it.
Any of the opinions? Yeah. But the second reason is that there are things in the economy that cause consumer harm. That, you know, consumers are being taken advantage of in some way, shape or form. And, you know, I think that there is a place for regulations, certainly. But I feel as though that the bureau has sort of gotten off that track and has now gotten to the point where, as I think I said earlier, where we talked up when we were talking offline, where the financial services industry is an enemy of the people. And, you know, the government is to rescue it. And the only way it can eventually rescue it to your point will make the financial services industry
hard of the government. But it’s not just financial services anymore. It’s, you know, big tech. It is, you know, anything that John, I’m here from the government and I’m here to help. Yeah. Those are the three scariest where the scariest phrase. Yeah. Scariest phrase that you could ever hear. I’m from the government and I’m here to help. Yeah. Yeah. So. And, you know, I, the government has become very good at doing like justifying its own interventions. For example, I can’t remember which I think it was with regard to the 1071 rule where they estimated that the cost of an examination to an entity was about $25,000. I almost fell off my chair laughing. Like,
$25,000 got to be kidding. I mean, that is so understated that it’s ridiculous. It’s like half of a person. It’s like a day. They told me it was 25 days. I believe it. Yeah. Yeah. So, you know, and that justifies why we can go to this level in terms of doing examination. It’s absurd. And it doesn’t get questioned. Or if it does get questioned, it doesn’t get responded to because you have one individual who manages on a top down basis. So. Well, going into 2024’s election year, I think we’re going to see a lot of unexpected’s this year. That’s kind of my prediction for this year is I
think it’s going to be as unpredictable as 2020 in so many different ways. But John, I really appreciate you coming on here and having a chat with me so openly. I know right after kind of even a position like that, it’s hard to get out there in public and start having conversations. But I appreciate you coming on and sharing your thoughts and hope to me. You know, like I said, and I do feel that there is a place for the bureau. I but I feel that the bureau is kind of losing its direction or lost its direction. And it is, you know, if you, you know, I don’t think
about that’s balance. So I think you echo the set. You echo my sentiments. I believe that there is an appropriate place. And I think that there are some things that the bureau has done that have been very positive both for the industry and for the consumer. But I think it’s important they stick to their processes and that they actually follow through with the processes and listen to those that they say that they’re listening to in that process. And hopefully they hire more people like you that have the experience and the understanding of nuts and bolts and how things work in our economy. It is a credit and that they have a voice and that they have a voice and that they’re listened to. I
feel like that’s a right and essential portion of that. No. I would think so, but you know, sometimes, hey, I have a shiny new John Teneti over here, but we’re putting him in a corner and, you know, I feel like I feel like I’ve been there before. Yeah, exactly. For those of you that are watching, if you have additional questions, you’d like to ask John and myself, you can leave those in the comments below on LinkedIn and YouTube will be responding to those. If you have additional topics you’d like to see us discuss, you can leave those in the comments below as well. And I bet you I can get John to come back at least
one more time to help me continue to create great content for a great industry. But until next time, thank you so much for coming on. I appreciate you. Thanks, Adam. I appreciate that. And thank you, everybody, for watching. We’ll talk to you again soon.
About Guest
About Company
Trade Credit & Liquidity Management (TCLM)
Trade Credit & Liquidity Management (TCLM) is an independent resource focused on trade credit, working capital, liquidity, and the broader quote-to-cash process. Its content includes practical analysis, industry developments, technology trends, and resources for credit, treasury, finance, and receivables professionals.







